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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE APPELLEE'S "MARSHALING" ARGUMENT 
MISSES THE POINT ENTIRELY 
Mr. Perry argues in the Brief of Appellee that the Jensens failed to 
marshall the evidence. However, it is abundantly clear from the argument 
that the point on which Perry claims that the evidence should be marshaled 
is not at all the point that the Jensens wish to make in this appeal. 
The entire thrust of Perry's argument is that the Jensens have not 
proved that they themselves relied upon the false statements of Mr. Perry 
and therefore fraud is not proven. However, Jensens do not make that 
claim. As will be shown below, the essence of the Jensen's appeal is that 
Mr. Perry made false statements to third parties, intending to damage the 
Jensens, and that the Jensens were in fact damaged thereby. 
All other elements of fraud are also met. Mr. Perry conceded that all 
other elements, aside from the reliance element, are supported by the 
Court's findings and are supported by the record. (See Appellee's Brief p. 
29.) 
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The only evidence to which the marshaling argument would apply, in 
suggesting that all evidence both pro and con should be marshaled, would 
be any evidence relating to the Plaintiffs denial of having made false 
statements. The fact is, there simply is no such evidence in the record 
anywhere. The Plaintiff attempts to justify his deceit, but nowhere denies it. 
The Brief of Appellee fails to indicate any such evidence. There simply is 
no such evidence to be marshaled. 
Mr. Perry proceeded to marshall evidence that the Jensens themselves 
did not rely upon the false statements, asserting that therefore the fraud is 
not proven. 
The Jensens base this appeal on the fact that a third party, acting 
reasonably and in ignorance of the falsity of the misrepresentation, did in 
fact rely upon it, causing the Jensens' injury and damage. 
The entire marshaling argument made by Mr. Perry can be thrown out 
as it is totally inapposite to the point made on appeal. 
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POINT II. 
JUSTIFIABLE RELIANCE BY A THIRD PARTY, UNDER THE 
FACTS OF THIS CASE, SUPPORTS THE CLAIM OF FRAUD. 
The Jensens counterclaimed against Mr. Perry based on the fact that, 
through Perry's misrepresentation and deceit, he obtained Quit Claim Deeds 
which clouded the Jensens' title forced them to defend their title in Court, 
and threatened them with the loss of their property. Mr. Perry's defense is 
that the statements were not made to the Jensens themselves but to other 
parties, and therefore the Jensens did not rely upon the false statements. 
The Jensens assert in this appeal that, provided all other elements of 
fraud are present, the element of justifiable reliance is met when, as under 
the circumstances of this case, a third party is deceived and the third party 
acts reasonably and justifiably in reliance upon it to cause the damage to the 
injured party. 
Although a case such as this, of blatant, scheming deceit, rarely 
reaches an Appellate Court, the principle of fraud based upon 
misrepresentation to third parties is not without precedent. According to 
Ellis v. Hale, 373 P.2d 382 (Utah, 1962), "[i]f a person fraudulently makes a 
misrepresentation of facts to another with the intent that it will be 
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transmitted to a third person, the latter may have a cause of action against 
the misrepresentor." The logical and proper extension of this principle is 
that if a person fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of facts to another 
with the intent that a third person will be damaged, the latter has a cause of 
action against misrepresentor. This is more clearly explained in Section 
533, Restatement of Torts, which reads as follows: 
The maker of a fraudulent misrepresentation is 
subject to liability for pecuniary loss to another who 
acts in justifiable reliance upon it if the 
misrepresentation, although not made directly to the 
other, is made to a third person and the maker 
intends or has reason to expect that its terms will be 
repeated or its substance communicated to the other, 
and that it will influence his conduct in the 
transaction or type of transaction involved. 
Cases illustrating this principle follow. 
In Handy v. Beck, 581 P.2d 68, (Oregon 1978), a Domestic water well 
driller was sued for damages when oil placed on a road running in front of 
the property seeped into the well, damaging the plumbing in the house and 
making the well unusable. The Plaintiff was a subsequent purchaser of the 
property. The lower Court held that the Plaintiff was not entitled to recover 
because he failed to prove that a misrepresentation had been made 
"directly" to him, or that he had relied upon the Defendant's 
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misrepresentation. On appeal, the Court held that the trial Court's 
requirement of proof that the Plaintiff had relied upon the misrepresentation 
conveyed to him was erroneous since, where the Defendant had both failed 
to make the required disclosure in the filing log with the State Engineer and 
had affirmatively concealed from the Plaintiffs predecessors in interest the 
fact that the well was not cased and sealed in compliance with State 
standards, thus creating a condition which injured the Plaintiff, the 
Plaintiffs right to recover against the Defendant for fraud was not 
dependent upon a misrepresentation being conveyed to him. 
In a case involving an automobile title, Varwig v. Anderson-Bethel 
Porsche/Audi, Inc., 141 Cal. Rptr. 539 (Cal. App. 1977), a Nevada dealer 
sold an automobile to a wholesaler which sold it to a California dealer. The 
Plaintiff purchased the automobile from the California dealer, and the 
Nevada dealer subsequently caused the car to be repossessed. The 
wholesale dealer argued that its representation was made only to the 
California dealer and hence was not actionable by the Plaintiff. The 
Plaintiff alleged that the wholesale dealer represented itself to be the owner 
of the automobile but knew that the representations were not true. The 
Plaintiff contended that the wholesale dealer's uncontradicted declaration 
5 
effectively removed any issue of direct representation to the Plaintiff since 
an actionable representation may be made directly as well as indirectly. The 
Court, citing the Restatement Second of Torts, noted that the maker of a 
fraudulent representation is subject to liability to another who acts in 
justifiable reliance on it if that misrepresentation, although not made 
directly to the other, is made to a third person and the maker intends, or has 
reason to suspect, that its terms will be repeated or its substance 
communicated to the other and that it will influence his conduct. 
The Jensens ask this Court to extend that principle to a situation in 
which misrepresentation is made to a third party, and the third party 
justifiably acts upon the misrepresentation, to the damage of the Plaintiff. 
In Ostano Commerzanstalt v. Telewide Systems, Inc., 794 F.2d 763 
(2nd Cir. 1986) a licensor of Movie Films misrepresented to its licensee that 
it had authority to license and distribute certain films. The licensee 
contracted with a sublicensee, who sued the licensor when the 
misrepresentation was discovered. The Court ruled that a fraudulent 
misrepresentation made with "notice in the circumstances of its making" 
that the person to whom it was made would communicate it to third party 
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subjects the person making the misrepresentation to liability to the third 
party. 
In Committee on Children's T. V. v. Gen. Foods, 197 Cal. Rptr. 783 
(Cal. 1983) a class action was brought charging Defendants with fraudulent, 
misleading and deceptive advertising in marketing of sugared breakfast 
cereals. In its defense to the fraud claim, the Defendant alleged the 
Complaint was deficient because it described the one group (the children) 
who received the misrepresentations and a different group (the parents) who 
purchase the product. The Court, in recognizing that Section 533 or the 
Restatement Second of Torts did not precisely cover the case presented (the 
Plaintiffs did not allege that the children repeated the representations to 
their parents but simply expressed their desire for the product), held that it 
should be sufficient that the Defendant makes misrepresentations to one 
group and then intending to influence the behavior of the ultimate purchaser 
and that he succeeds in his plan. 
Although in a different context, the language of Committee on 
Children's T. V. applies directly to the facts of the present case. 
In a similar case, Michael v. Shiley, Inc., 46 F.3d 1316 (3rd Cir. 
1995), the makers of a defective heart valve were sued by a patient in whom 
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the valve was implanted. The sources of the misrepresentation were letters 
written by the Defendant to doctors as well as advertisements and other 
promotional material. The Court concluded that the Defendant had ample 
reason to expect that the patients and eventual recipients of the defective 
valve implants would be affected by the information published and 
distributed to doctors. That, in fact, was the Defendant's intent. The 
Defendant had to anticipate that its letters and advertisements would lead 
doctors to recommend, and the patients to choose, the Defendant's valve. 
The fact that the Defendant initially made its representations to the doctors, 
rather than directly to the patients, does not undermine the claim of fraud. 
In Florida Rock & Tank Lines, Inc. v. Moore, 365 S.E.2d 836 (Ga. 
1988), a gas station owner promised the gasoline supplier that he would 
make payment for future deliveries of gasoline. The gasoline supplier, in 
reliance upon that representation, authorized the gasoline delivery company 
to make delivery of gasoline shipments. Upon the gas station owner's 
failure to pay, the delivery company reimbursed the gasoline supplier and 
sued the owner of the station. The Court held that the requirement of 
reliance is satisfied where A, having as his objective to defraud C, and 
knowing that C will rely upon B, fraudulent induces B to act in some 
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manner on which C relies and whereby A's purpose of defrauding C is 
accomplished. In this case, the Court did not require a showing of a 
representation made directly to the person who suffered damages from the 
fraud. 
There are several automobile odometer roll-back cases in which the 
Court allowed recovery against the person that rolled back the odometer, 
despite the fact that there were intervening owners. See Freeman v. Myers, 
774 S.W.2d 892 (MO. App. 1989) mdPelsterv. Ray, 987 F.2d 514 (8th 
Cir. 1993). It is only one small step, which is supported in logic and in 
equity, to conclude that the reliance by a third party on a fraudulent 
statement, if justifiable, supports a cause of action by the person that is 
actually damaged by the fraud, particularly where the damage done was that 
damage precisely intended by the misrepresentor. 
Mr. Perry does not assert that the third parties, in this case Judd and 
Judy Kemp and Barry Fillmore, did not rely upon the statements of Mr. 
Perry. They obviously did rely upon them, since they acted in signing the 
Quit Claim Deeds. Nor does Mr. Perry suggest that they were not justified 
in their reliance. In fact, as it turns out, the very party that the innocent 
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third parties were intending to aid turned out to be the party that they 
unwittingly injured because of Mr. Perry's misrepresentation. 
The fact that the third parties were justified in their reliance is 
demonstrated by the following: 
1. When Mr. Perry asked the Kemps to sign the Quit Claim Deed, 
he represented that the deed was requested to take care of a minor 
discrepancy about title to the property. (See Affidavit of Judd Kemp, 
Exhibit "R" to Jensens' Countermotion for Partial Summary Judgment.) 
(For references to the record, see exhibits attached to Brief of 
Appellant.) 
2. The meeting during which the Quit Claim Deed was obtained 
from the Kemps occurred late at night, and it was represented to them that 
there was some urgency about the matter that required it to be done that 
night. (See Exhibit "V" to Countermotion, Kemp Deposition p. 27.) 
3. Mr. Perry represented that he was already the owner of the 
property in question. (See Trial Transcript pgs. 337 - 334; Countermotion 
Exhibit "R," Judd Kemp Affidavit; and Countermotion Exhibit "V," Kemp 
Deposition pgs. 26-31.) 
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4. Mr. Perry stated that he was attempting to clear up problems or 
difficulties to allow development of the corner property (the Jensens 
property) to go forward, and that he was attempting to rectify errors on 
documents that Kemps had previously signed. (See Exhibit "V" to 
Countermotion, Kemp Deposition pg. 29.) 
5. The Kemps were not experts in legal descriptions (Judd Kemp 
Deposition p. 16, Exhibit "V" to Countermotion). 
6. Furthermore, Mr. Perry misrepresented to Barry Fillmore that 
he was owner of the Jensen parcel and that he had purchased it. (Trial 
transcript pgs. 350 -351; Barry Fillmore Affidavit Exhibit "S" to 
Countermotion; Fillmore Deposition pgs. 15-20, Exhibit "W" to 
Countermotion.) 
7. Mr. Perry concealed from Mr. Fillmore that by obtaining the 
Quit Claim Deed he was attempting to obtain control over a 20-foot strip of 
Jensens' property. (Trial Transcript p. 353) 
There is no evidence in the record that suggests that either Kemps or 
Mr. Fillmore suspected or should have suspected that Mr. Perry was 
deceitful or unreliable. Therefore, there is nothing to show that their 
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reliance upon Mr. Perry's representations was anything other than 
reasonable and justified. 
CONCLUSION 
This Reply Brief addresses only new matters set forth in the Brief of 
Appellee. His "marshaling" argument does not apply. The marshaling 
argument argues that the Jensens should have marshaled the evidence on the 
issue of Jensens own reliance. That is not the issue. The Jensens are willing 
to rest their case on the principle that, provided all other elements of fraud 
exist, justifiable reliance upon a misrepresentation made to a third party, is 
actionable by another party who was injured. The fact of making a 
misrepresentation to someone other than the injured party, when the 
misrepresentation causes the intended damage, does not insulate the 
wrongdoer from liability to any degree. 
Because all other elements of fraud are conceded, this Court should 
overrule the lower Court's findings No. 36, ("There is not evidence that 
Plaintiff made any fraudulent statements to Defendants or to anyone else") 
and No. 37 ("There is no evidence that Plaintiff engaged in fraudulent 
conduct toward Defendant or anyone else."), enter a finding that fraud was 
12 
committed, and remand the case back to the lower Court for entry of 
judgment for the full amount of the Jensens' damages. 
DATED this day of October, JJ 
"RICHARD^. BRADF)ORD/ 
Attorney for defendants/ Aipffellants 
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